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new knowledge. Moreover how this 
knowledge is subsequently used is not 
the responsibility of  science. The scene 
is thereby set for a classic argument 
that goes back a long way, certainly 
to C P Snow’s “two cultures” debate 
which hit the headlines in the 1960s1. 
Recently the issue has taken on a new 
dimension due to the credit crunch 
and the need for greater public saving. 
British research councils now empha-
sise likely “impact” as an important 
criterion for funding public research. 
Similar injunctions are made by higher 
education funding bodies in deciding 
how university departments should be 
judged in the allocation of  research 
monies. The problem of  course is that 
research “impact” is enormously hard 
to compute both ex ante (it takes time 
for the seed corn to germinate) and ex 
post (the seed corn has been combined 
Putting Research into Use (RIU): 
Technology Development for the Poor Farmer in Low Income Countries
By Norman Clark
The Research Into Use programme 
aims to help agricultural research proj-
ects put its existing stock of knowledge 
into practical use rather than investing 
in new scientific research. In doing 
this, it hopes to increase the reach of 
the scientific projects in low-income 
countries and set up productive, sus-
tainable and high impact technologic 
development projects.
A continuous (and long running) issue in public policy debate is that of  how to fund science. 
Whereas what private companies do is 
their own business (usually concerned 
with normal profit maximising behav-
iour) most industrialised countries now 
have enormous budgets designed to 
fund bodies to search for, validate and 
diffuse information which may (or may 
not) have benefit for social welfare. The 
argument put simply is that if  the state 
does not do this then society as a whole 
will suffer. The argument is sometimes 
put in cultural terms but deep down 
the belief  is ultimately connected with 
the potential use of  new knowledge in 
achieving social and economic welfare 
goals. Hence the enormous sums of  
money routinely spent on higher educa-
tion, national research councils, govern-
ment ministries and related organisa-
tions. Every so often, however, the sheer 
costs involved arouse public concern. 
Attempts are then made to rationalise 
expenditure like the UK Rothschild 
Commission on in-house government 
R&D funding (1971) or the creation 
of  “Technology Foresight” activity 
run by the UK Office of  Science and 
Technology (OST).
Running through much of  this dis-
cussion is reluctance on the part of  
scientific communities to lose deci-
sion-making autonomy. Since they, 
and they alone, fully understand their 
work’s complexity, interference by 
penny-pinching bureaucrats will com-
promise scientific quality and endan-
ger the “seed corn” that arises from 
Due to the credit crunch and the need for greater public 
saving, British research councils now emphasise likely “im-
pact” as an important criterion for funding public research. 
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leveraged into aid programmes both as a 
contributory player and as potential new 
local start-up businesses.
Best Bets
These features are illustrated by one of  
the RIU component activities, the Best 
Bets sub-programme. The inspiration 
for the RIU Best Bets initiative came 
from the successful and popular BBC 
television programme Dragons’ Den. 
Versions of  this programme had been 
broadcast around the world under a 
variety of  local names (Money Tigers 
in Japan; Shark Tank in the USA). The 
basic concept is that would-be entre-
preneurs pitch their business ideas to a 
panel of  wealthy and successful entre-
preneurs who, subject to satisfactory 
due diligence, invest their own money 
and expertise in proposals that they find 
convincing in return for an equity stake 
in the business. RIU Best Bets took the 
central tenets of  ideas being pitched to 
an expert panel and rigorous due dili-
gence, but in other significant aspects 
the procedure and principles varied sig-
nificantly. A major difference was that 
the RIU Best Bets panellists would not 
invest their own resources; rather they 
make recommendations as to how RIU 
should invest its programme money.6
The objective of  RIU Best Bets was 
to identify promising proposals to take 
existing agriculture research products 
and put these into use in ways that 
would benefit the poor (and others) in 
developing countries through partner-
ships in which private sector actors 
play a major role. The sum set aside for 
with many other resources and suitable 
“agronomy” to produce its fruit; so it 
hard to say how instrumental the origi-
nal “seed” has really been).
Research into Use Programme 
(RIU)
This short article provides an illustra-
tive example of  this general issue, an 
example that has tried to move it on 
in policy terms. It concerns poverty-
related economic development aid in 
very poor rural regions of  the world, 
in this case Africa. In the early 2000s 
The UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) had become 
increasingly concerned about its 
research expenditure in the natural 
resources sector. Under its Renewable 
Natural Resources Research Strategy 
(RNRRS) it had funded, through its 
Central Research Department (CRD), 
some 1600 projects costing £220 million 
between 1995 and 2005, largely in UK 
research organisations; but it seemed 
impossible to demonstrate how and to 
what extent the resultant “knowledge” 
had resulted in practical low income 
country (LIC) development, particularly 
for impoverished rural communities 
heavily dependent on subsistence agri-
culture. In response the CRD decided 
that research targeted at development 
was necessary but not sufficient – what 
was required was additional effort 
aimed at putting the knowledge into use. 
Accordingly it launched a call for con-
sortia whose remit was precisely to fill 
this gap. This took the form of  a £37.5m 
for a programme designed to validate 
and promote the best innovations from 
previous RNRRS research.
The RIU programme was launched 
in July 20062. Its approach was to shift 
the focus of  attention away from the 
tasks involved in the generation of  new 
knowledge to the ways in which an exist-
ing stock of  knowledge can be put to 
productive use. What has distinguished 
it from most technology development 
activities is the inclusion of  three char-
acteristics. The first is its use of  the 
idea of  an innovation system to guide 
its operations3. What this has meant in 
practice is that successful technology 
development depends on a network of  
organisations and individuals involved 
in generating, modifying, and using new 
knowledge. Science is important but it is 
only one of  many necessary inputs from 
ancillary bodies in the private and NGO 
sectors. Innovation, not science, is the 
centre of  gravity.
Secondly it was introduced as a learn-
ing programme. Unlike modern indus-
try where the investing firm routinely 
accesses whatever new knowledge it 
needs either from its own R&D depart-
ments or outside cognate bodies, the 
small poor farmer has no similar option. 
At the same time publicly financed 
extension systems have ceased to be fit 
for comparable purpose4. But how can 
an aid agency fill the gap? This was a 
question that needed its own investiga-
tion. But of  course “impact” cannot be 
identified ex ante for the obvious reason 
that the outcomes are learned through 
actually carrying out projects. This 
proved hard for a government depart-
ment to manage but DFID has shown 
it can be done. Thirdly there are wider 
issues of  foreign aid dependence and 
arguably its relative failure to create 
independent entrepreneurship and 
growth in some recipient countries5. So 
an important aspect of  RIU has been to 
investigate how the private sector can be 
RIU was launched in July 2006. Its approach was to shift 
the focus of attention away from the tasks involved in the 
generation of new knowledge to the ways in which an ex-
isting stock of knowledge can be put to productive use. 
The objective of RIU Best Bets was to identify promising proposals to take existing agricul-
ture research products and put these into use in ways that would benefit the poor in develop-
ing countries through partnerships in which private sector actors play a major role.
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enabling innovation. RIU researchers 
would rigorously monitor the Best Bets 
with a view to teasing out useful lessons; 
what worked well, what worked less 
well and why? These lessons would 
then form an important part of  RIU 
output and would help shape future 
policy and practice to enable research 
to have greater impact on small-scale 
agricultural innovation. The Best Bet 
teams were also expected to work 
closely with RIU communication spe-
cialists and journalists to achieve wide-
spread coverage of  their research into 
use success stories.
Outcomes, Impact and Policy
What have been the broad conclusions 
of  this venture? To begin with it quickly 
became evident that there were no “low 
hanging technological fruit” emanating 
from the original RNRRS projects that 
could easily be put into use. Instead a 
context had to be created within which 
the science could be embedded. Most 
of  the initial Best Bet proposals fell at 
an early stage simply because scientists 
wished to carry on practicing science 
(producing more seed corn!) and failed 
to grasp the developmental nature of  
the required projects. But in the selected 
projects it became clear that scien-
tists had a major role to play in adap-
tive R&D and mentorship connected 
to the original RNRRS projects. In the 
selected 9 funded best bets over 60 of  the 
original projects were used (despite the 
apparent lack of  low hanging fruit at the 
start). And so the creation of  a suitable 
context became the key. Its characteris-
tics in summary were:
this in Africa was £5 million. Coverage 
would be on any aspect of  agriculture in 
Africa - including crops, livestock, fish-
eries or forestry throughout the entire 
value chain, from production, through 
processing, storage and input and output 
markets, to consumption. In September 
2009 advertisements were placed in a 
number of  newspapers covering East, 
Central and Southern Africa inviting the 
submission of  Best Bets concept notes. 
Applicants were asked to limit these 
to two pages only; they would state 
how much financial support they were 
seeking from RIU, but no limits were 
specified. Concept notes were required 
to address four criteria:
• The proposal should be grounded 
in rigorous research in agriculture, 
including fisheries and forestry
• The originators of  the research should 
be involved in the programme in a 
significant way so that they would be 
able to apply their tacit knowledge 
and learning to the programme
• The proposal was expected to achieve 
significant development impact at 
scale in East and/or Central Africa 
(and perhaps beyond)
• The proposal should comprise a 
consortium of  partners (e.g. aca-
demic, public sector, NGO) led by 
an African institution and should 
include a private sector partner with 
evidence of  support, which could be 
financial or in-kind
By the deadline for submissions in 
early October 2009, RIU had received 
105 concept notes7. These were screened 
in a process in which RIU was assisted 
by the London-based Cambridge 
Economic Policy Associates (CEPA) 
- an economic and financial policy 
advisory business. A short-list of  11 
proposals was developed. In two cases, 
pairs of  proposals that appeared to offer 
significant opportunity for synergy (an 
army worm forecasting system and an 
army worm control technology; and 
two aquaculture proposals) were invited 
to amalgamate their proposals. The lead 
organisation for the short-listed propos-
als was asked to write a business plan 
following a format provided by RIU. 
To facilitate this, a grant of  £1,500 
was made available which teams used 
in various ways, such as to bring team 
members together to enable them to 
work jointly on their plans. Two rep-
resentatives from each proposal were 
also supported to attend the “dragon’s 
den” event in Nairobi on 26th and 27th 
November 2009.
At this event, two representatives 
of  each of  the short-listed proposals 
presented their idea to the indepen-
dent panel drawn from leaders in the 
African business, finance and research 
and development communities. The 
panellists had already read the business 
plans. Following a ten-minute oral pre-
sentation, panellists had 20 minutes to 
interrogate the proposal, followed by a 
further 10 minutes in private to discuss 
the proposal among themselves. At the 
end of  the day, the panel announced 
the proposals they were recommend-
ing that RIU should support. Subject 
to due diligence, RIU accepted these 
recommendations and proceeded to 
issuing contracts. 
The money that RIU invested in the 
selected Best Bets was in the form of  a 
grant since RIU’s expected return on its 
investment was not financial; it was to 
be in the form of  learning. The Best Bet 
proposals which RIU supported would 
thus become part of  an experiment in 
The money that RIU invested in the selected Best Bets was in the form of a grant since RIU’s 
expected return on its investment was not financial. The Best Bet proposals which RIU sup-
ported would thus become part of an experiment in enabling innovation. 
Most of the initial Best Bet proposals fell at an early stage 
simply because scientists wished to carry on practicing sci-
ence (producing more seed corn!) and failed to grasp the de-
velopmental nature of the required projects.
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1. In all cases the mobilisation of  other 
linked knowledge sources proved 
necessary. Often these derived from 
NGO bodies but included govern-
ment departments, local and interna-
tional science bodies as well of  course 
as the private sector itself. Indeed the 
projects worked best as consortia in 
which the different stakeholders oper-
ated as an holistic innovation system 
with each player contributing its own 
unique expertise.
2. In all cases private sector inter-
ests have played a key role, both as 
“product champions” and as the 
core activity ensuring economic con-
tinuity. Clearly economic incentives 
have an important role in ensuring 
longer-term sustainability and in 
some cases markets for established 
firms have expanded as new outlets 
have been created. In addition there 
have been a range of  new small busi-
nesses created as a result of  RIU 
interventions and there are indica-
tions that new forms of  financial 
support will be forthcoming from 
venture capital sources.
3. The evidence has confirmed the gen-
erally held view that formal national 
government- led extension systems 
need to be modified (if  not replaced) 
and it became clear that the private 
sector should now play a much 
greater role in this respect. In this 
way it should help to improve the 
pace and impact of  technology devel-
opment for the rural poor.
4. In many cases RIU Best Bet proj-
ects have helped to mobilise national 
capacities, particularly in universities. 
This is important in the light of  fre-
quent criticisms of  Higher Education 
[HE] sector viability in Africa and the 
need to encourage local innovation. 
5. In all cases RIU project funding 
played a necessary role in covering 
pre-investment costs associated with 
risk and related factors. It is likely that 
this type of  pre-competitive support 
will continue to be an area for neces-
sary technology development aid. 
6. The actual business of  technology 
development was in all cases fairly 
complex involving applications 
engineering, negotiations with gov-
ernment regulatory bodies, access-
ing products through imports (in the 
absence of  local production capac-
ity) and dealing with the many prob-
lems that always plague new innova-
tive ventures.
At the same time not all the projects 
succeeded in output and impact terms. 
The successful ones helped create entre-
preneurship and employment. Others 
(still on-going) may evolve into success 
given more time. Yet others have clearly 
failed. But the DFID experiment has 
learned a lot. It has for example, shown 
that an aid agency can manage risk and 
catalyse technology development in the 
most unlikely contexts. To do so may 
require a lighter and imaginative mana-
gerial touch. But it will also argue for 
linking research more directly to pro-
duction. In the case of  private sector 
input it is also clear that it can and 
should make a major contribution to 
international technology development 
for the rural poor.
As for scientific communities them-
selves there is a strong case for going 
well beyond the “seed corn” model. 
The original RNRRS projects no doubt 
produced good science but results 
often stayed on publication shelves, 
raw material for more funding from 
research councils and related bodies. 
While it is clear that committed scien-
tists have often played a valuable devel-
opmental role, the pattern of  incen-
tives within which they work tends to 
minimise the impact they could poten-
tially make. The DFID experiment has 
References
1. Snow C P (1961) Science in Government, 
Harvard University Press, Harvard, USA.
2. It finished in December 2012.
3. Hall A, (2009) Challenges to Strengthening 
Agricultural Innovation Systems:  Where Do We 
Go From Here?  In Scoones, I., & Thompson, 
J. (2009) Farmer First Revisited. Rugby: Practical 
Action.
4. Anderson J R (2008) “Agricultural Advisory 
Services,” Background Paper for the World Bank 
Development Report, World Bank, Washington DC
5. Moyo D (2010) Dead Aid: Why aid is not working 
and how there is another way for Africa, Amazon 
Books
6. The RIU panel who worked like the dragons 
on Dragons’ Den were Judi Wakhungu, 
Executive Director of  the African Centre for 
Technology Studies; Muchiri Wahome (Chair) 
Managing Director of  Deacons (K) Limited, 
the leading chain store in the region; Patrick 
Oketa, Chief  Investment Officer at the Kampala-
based African Agricultural Capital and Ali A 
Mufuruki, Chairman and CEO of  the Infotech 
Investment Group in Tanzania.
7. These came from East and Southern Africa. 
The call then went out to West Africa; this gener-
ated 20 more proposals.
shown a way forward. Let us hope that 
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the pattern of incentives within which they work tends to minimise the impact they could 
potentially make. The DFID experiment has shown a way forward. 
